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The Dutiful Conscript: 
An Originalist View of Justice 
Wilson’s Conception of Charter 
Rights and Their Limits 
Adam M. Dodek* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few judges have attracted as much attention as Justice Bertha 
Wilson, whose tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada coincided with 
the Charter’s first nine years (1982-1991).1 Justice Wilson was 
considered the Court’s most liberal member and the justice who 
consistently exercised the powers of judicial review more rigorously 
than any other justice.2 In so doing, she became a lightning rod for 
criticism as well as a beacon for praise and hope. She has been called the 
Charter’s “most fervent enforcer on the Court”3 and she has also been 
accused of the most egregious violations of judicial impartiality.4 While 
                                                                                                             
* Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. Thank you to Jonathan 
Bricker and Laura Johnson for providing invaluable research assistance and to Jamie Cameron for 
making her research materials on Justice Wilson available to me. Thank you to Robin Elliot, Dwight 
Newman and Jamie Cameron for reading earlier drafts of this paper and providing helpful 
comments. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. While the Charter 
came into effect on April 12, 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada did not hear and decide its first 
Charter case until 1984. See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] S.C.J. No. 18, 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
2 See David M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of 
Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), at 59. 
3 See Andrée Lajoie & Henry Quillinan, “The Supreme Court Judges’ Views of the Role 
of the Courts in the Application of the Charter” in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds., 
Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal and 
Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 93, at 95. 
4 See Robert E. Hawkins & Robert I. Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson” 
(1995) 45 McGill L.J. 1, at 49-56 (Part IV: Judicial Integrity) [hereinafter “‘Democracy, Judging 
and Bertha Wilson’”] and Robert I. Martin, The Most Dangerous Branch: How the Supreme Court 
of Canada Has Undermined Our Law and Our Democracy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003), at 83. 
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she was routinely branded as “judicial activist”, such labels serve only to 
caricature Justice Wilson’s jurisprudence rather than to illuminate it. 
During her relatively short time on the Supreme Court, Justice Wilson 
constructed an independent and distinct approach to the relationship 
between rights and their limits under the Charter, mostly through her 
statements regarding section 1 and her application of the Oakes test5 and 
its larger framework.  
Perhaps without much exaggeration, section 1 has been called “the 
single most important provision” in the Charter because it requires 
courts to “confront the legitimacy and scope of their mandate under the 
Charter to strike down or alter the laws of Parliament and the 
legislature”.6 Through her judgments and her speeches, Justice Wilson 
articulated a confident and coherent approach to section 1 and the new 
role of the judiciary under the Charter. In an article that she authored 
almost a decade after she stepped down from the nation’s highest court, 
Justice Wilson expressed frustration with the continued questioning of 
the legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter. In the appropriately 
titled “We Didn’t Volunteer”, Justice Wilson argued that the people’s 
duly elected representatives conferred upon the courts not just the right 
but the duty to frustrate the will of the majority through the process of 
judicial review. She expressed difficulty reconciling a policy of judicial 
deference with “a duty of judicial review designed to protect the 
entrenched rights of citizens”.7 “We Didn’t Volunteer” reveals Justice 
Wilson’s conception of the judicial role under the Charter which 
manifested itself in her approach to section 1. 
To Justice Wilson, judicial review was a duty imposed on the courts 
by the Charter through a deliberate and high-profile democratic process.8 
Her conception of the judicial role under the Charter draws its 
sustenance from a strong historical claim about both the purpose and the 
process of rights entrenchment under the Charter. Justice Wilson’s 
vision of the relationship between rights and their limits under the 
                                                                                                             
5 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
6 John A. Terry, “Section 1: Controlling the Oakes Analysis” in Patrick J. Monahan, 
Eleanor A. Cronk & Neil Finkelstein, eds., Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2001: 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2002) 479, at 479. 
7 Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 9. 
8 Id.; and Bertha Wilson, “The Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1985) 50 Sask. L. Rev. 
169, at 173 (terming the judicial role in interpreting the Charter a “tremendous responsibility”). See 
also Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
486, at 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”] (describing the Charter as a “new and 
onerous responsibility” entrusted to the courts). 
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Charter is an originalist one — one that is based on the assertion that the 
legitimacy of the judicial interpretive role finds its source in the events 
of 1980-1982 when the Charter was enacted. To characterize Justice 
Wilson, who is widely considered as one of the architects of contextual 
interpretation,9 as an originalist may appear contradictory if not puzzling 
to some. However, as I demonstrate in this article, her conception of the 
appropriate relationship between rights and limits under the Charter 
should be considered originalist, properly understood. 
This article has three parts in addition to this introduction. In Part II, 
I analyze Justice Wilson’s conception of rights and limits under the 
Charter and demonstrate how it is anchored in a normative vision of the 
events of 1980-1982. I explain what I mean by “originalism” and how 
Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision fits this description. Part III 
demonstrates how this originalist conception of the Charter permeated 
Justice Wilson’s model of the relationship between rights and their 
limits, mostly, but not exclusively, through her section 1 jurisprudence. 
In this part, I distinguish between the multiple meanings of Oakes — the 
case, the framework and the test — and show how Justice Wilson 
focused on the much stricter Oakes framework while her colleagues 
were relaxing the Oakes test. This part further shows how Justice 
Wilson’s fidelity to the strictness of the Oakes framework translated into 
her staunch insistence on section 1 as the sole source of limits on rights, 
her fixation on onus and evidence and her understanding of the 
relationship between section 1 and other sections of the Charter. Finally, 
this article ends in Part IV with a brief conclusion on the themes of 
constitutional duty and destiny. 
II. MODERATE ORIGINALISM AND JUSTICE WILSON’S CHARTER 
1. Understanding Originalism in Canada 
Originalism is a dirty word in Canadian constitutional law. It finds 
few defenders in the academy and even fewer (if any) on the bench. 
Justice Wilson would have surely strongly resisted any attempt to 
characterize her as an originalist.10 So how can I make the claim that her 
                                                                                                             
9 See Shalin M. Sugunasiri, “Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New Standard of 
Judicial Analysis and Accountability” (1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 126. 
10 Cf. Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judicature 334, at 336-37 
[hereinafter “‘The Making of a Constitution’”] (acknowledging criticisms of framers’ intent and 
impliedly endorsing such criticisms). 
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view of the relationship between rights and their limits was based on an 
originalist conception of the Charter? It begins with the assertion of the 
failure to properly comprehend the term “originalism” and the inability 
to imagine the application of the doctrine in the Canadian context. 
Properly understood, originalism represents a valid but neglected 
constitutional vision and accurately describes Justice Wilson’s conception 
of rights and limits under the Charter. By “originalism”, I mean to 
include theories of interpretation that give some weight to various 
aspects of the historical dynamics involved in the making of the Charter. 
As I explain below, this is a broad definition that encompasses a 
spectrum of possible resort to historical sources in constitutional 
interpretation. Justice Wilson’s originalism is a moderate variant of 
originalism. 
Originalism is either ignored or denigrated in Canada. While 
American scholars have developed a rich and sometimes nuanced 
originalist scholarship,11 in Canada academic examination of the subject 
is sparse.12 Moreover, in Canada there is a tendency to simply equate 
originalism with “framers’ intent” — the strand of originalism which 
holds that the subjective intentions of the framers of the Constitution 
should be the authoritative normative source for the interpretation of its 
substantive provisions. This is further equated with the widely 
discredited “frozen rights theory” under the Canadian Bill of Rights.13 
Under this dominant interpretative theory of the bill, the rights protected 
by the Canadian Bill of Rights were only those that were in existence at 
the time that the bill was enacted, i.e., 1960. This led critics to label it 
“the frozen rights theory” and helped fuel the push for a constitutional 
bill of rights which would both consist of and be capable of growth 
                                                                                                             
11 For a recent intellectual and political history of originalism in the United States, see 
Jonathan O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore & 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). 
12 For the few articles that touch on originalism, see Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights 
and American Theories of Interpretation” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87; F.L. Morton & Rainer 
Knopff, “Permanence and Change in a Written Constitution: The ‘Living Tree’ Doctrine and the 
Charter of Rights” (1990) 1 S.C.L.R. (2d) 533; Robin Elliot, “The Charter Revolution and the Court 
Party: Sound Critical Analysis or Blinkered Political Polemic?” (2002) 35 U.B.C. L. Rev. 271; M. 
Stephens, “Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist Construction of Section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter” (2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 183; Grant Huscroft, “A Constitutional ‘Work in Progress’? 
The Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413; Justice Ian 
Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. (2d) 345; and Sujit 
Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 1, at 16-27 (reviewing the legislative drafting around s. 7). 
13 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
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beyond the rights frozen in the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights. Framers’ 
intent was associated with the frozen rights theory because it too focuses 
on the particular meaning ascribed to specific rights at their point of 
enactment. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the frozen rights 
theory for the interpretation of the Charter.14 
Justice Wilson explicitly disavowed framers’ intent and embraced a 
purposive approach to constitutional interpretation consistent with the 
living tree doctrine which sees the Constitution as “capable of growth 
and expansion within its natural limits”.15 The curt dismissal by Justice 
Lamer (as he then was) of the intent of the framers in the Motor Vehicle 
Reference16 together with the talismanic invocation of the living tree 
doctrine has effectively silenced any discussion of originalism in Canada 
since 1985. Since the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court has 
continued to make reference to the intent of the framers, but such 
references have been episodic, inconsistent and unpredictable.17 Justice 
Lamer’s dismissal of framers’ intent in Motor Vehicle Reference 
occurred at the same time as a heated and vibrant debate on originalism 
was being launched in the United States.18 So while the debate on 
                                                                                                             
14 See Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, supra, note 1, at 365-66; Singh v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 
209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]; R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
295, at 342-44 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, at 1326-27 
(S.C.C.). See Tanya Lee, “Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep” (2008) 41 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 263 (for discussion of casting off the constraint of the Bill of Rights in interpreting the 
Charter). 
15 See “The Making of a Constitution”, supra, note 10, at 336-38, citing Edwards v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1929] J.C.J. No. 2, [1930] A.C. 124, and 126 (J.C.P.C.), per Lord 
Sankey.  
16 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 8. 
17 See, e.g., New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, at para. 106 (S.C.C.); R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 
3 S.C.R. 236, at para. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, at para. 
107 (S.C.C.); Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 327, at para. 107 (S.C.C.); McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 
3 S.C.R. 229, at 340-41 (S.C.C.); United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] S.C.J. No. 56, [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 1469, at 1479-80 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 
143-44 (S.C.C.); Reference re Bill 30, an Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 
44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, at 1163 (S.C.C.); and Reference re Public Service Employment Relations 
Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No.10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at 412-13 (S.C.C.). 
18 The time during which the Motor Vehicle Reference was under reserve coincided with 
the rise of originalism as both a political issue and a constitutional theory of interpretation through 
notable speeches by President Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Judge 
Robert Bork, and a public response by Justice William Brennan. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, 
“A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate” in Steven G. Calabresi, ed., Originalism: A 
Quarter-Century of Debate (Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc. 2007) 1, at 1-17. For the text of 
the referenced speeches see Calabresi, Originalism: A Quarter Century of Debate, id., at 47 et seq. 
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originalism was opening up and heating up in the United States, it was 
being closed down and quieted in Canada. As a result, Canadians have 
failed or refused to explore the possibilities of originalism in a Canadian 
context.19  
Originalism and framers’ intent are not coterminous; the latter is but 
one subset of the former. In its strictest form, originalism professes “the 
binding authority of the text of the Constitution or the intention of its 
adopters”.20 However, commentators often distinguish between stricter 
and looser or more moderate forms of originalism. The loose form views 
originalism as an informed point of departure for a contemporary 
decision, whereas the strict form insists that the original meaning should 
                                                                                                             
(Speech by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985), 
55 et seq. (Speech by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., at Georgetown University, October 12, 1985), 
83 et seq. (Speech by Judge Robert H. Bork at the University of San Diego Law School, November 
18, 1985). The nomination of Judge Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court ignited a public and academic 
debate over originalism. See, e.g., Jonathan O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A 
Constitutional History, supra, note 11, at 161-89 (chapter on Robert Bork and the Trial of 
Originalism). 
19 This is not the place for a full analysis of the contextual differences between concerns 
about framers’ intent in the United States and Canada. However, several critical distinctions may be 
notable. First, framers’ intent is often criticized on the normative grounds that the American polity 
should not be ruled by the intentions of a long-dead class of men. Given the recentness of the 
enactment of the Charter, Canadian jurists cannot simply dismiss framers’ intent on this basis. 
Moreover, the recentness of the Charter supports framers’ intent in Canada and a normative 
argument must be presented as to why the intent of the framers should be ignored in Canada. 
Second, framers’ intent is often criticized in the United States on empirical grounds, for the lack of 
authoritative records of the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia which produced the 
Constitution. No such problem exists in Canada as we are awash in official and unofficial records of 
the various conferences, the proceedings before the Joint Committee, debates in Parliament and 
provincial legislatures, etc. See also Lorraine E. Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm 
Lost?” (2002) 6 Review of Constitutional Studies 119, at 156 n. 95 (listing additional factors) 
[hereinafter “‘Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?’”]. Tanya Lee has articulated an 
interesting explanation for the Supreme Court of Canada’s disregard for framers’ intent. She states 
that it “likely sprang from a prosaic cause”. According to Lee,  
[w]hen the Americans speak of framers’ intent, they speak of those who drafted the 
American Bill of Rights, of revolutionary heroes, of Madison and Jefferson. In contrast, the 
Charter was the product of its age, of its champions, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, but 
also of public participation . . ., and political brinkmanship. Unlike the American founding 
fathers, the framers of the Charter were alive and kicking and available for comment. 
However, if they had been called as witnesses, the Supreme Court likely would have seen 
these individuals, despite their outstanding contributions, as contemporary practitioners of 
the rough art of politics, not as golden historical figures. Perfection is more easily perceived 
from afar. 
Tanya Lee, “Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 263. 
20 Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding” (1980) 60 Boston 
U. L. Rev. 204, at 204 [hereinafter “‘The Misconceived Quest’”]. 
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prevail.21 Originalism can operate on a very specific level, examining the 
meaning of specific constitutional terms, or it can function on a higher 
level of generality. Justice Wilson’s originalism is of this moderate 
variant, which focuses on the original understanding of the Charter at a 
higher level of abstraction. 
There are various forms of originalism. The terms “original 
meaning”, “original intention” and “original understanding” are often 
used interchangeably in an imprecise manner. However, as explained by 
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Jack Rakove, they each have distinct 
meanings. Original meaning refers to the attempt to recover the literal 
wording — the language — of the many provisions of the Constitution. 
Original intent refers to those actors whose decisions produced the 
constitutional language whose meaning is at issue, i.e., the framers. 
Original understanding is a broader term which covers the impressions 
and interpretations of the Constitution formed by its original readers — 
the citizens, polemicists and convention delegates who participated one 
way or another in ratification.22 On a strict view of originalism, the 
specific meaning, intent or understanding should be authoritative 
because it provides the best democratic licence for judicial review under 
a written constitution. On a more moderate view, such originalist 
conceptions are entitled to some weight in constitutional interpretation 
but are not authoritative. 
As critics of strict originalism have pointed out, framers’ intent has 
two components. Framers’ substantive intent consists of the views of the 
framers regarding the meaning of particular constitutional provisions 
that they enacted. Their interpretive intent refers to how those 
substantive understandings are interpreted and applied by the courts.23 
There is no necessary connection between substantive intent originalism 
and interpretative intent originalism. The framers of a constitution may 
have very specific views regarding the content of particular constitutional 
provisions but not intend that those views be authoritative and 
conclusive for purposes of constitutional interpretation.24 This point is 
                                                                                                             
21 See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), at 9 [hereinafter “Original Meanings”]. On Brest’s 
different forms of originalism, see id., at 204-205. 
22 Original Meanings, id., at 7-8. 
23 See Patrick Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), at 77 [hereinafter “Politics and the 
Constitution”], citing “The Misconceived Quest”, supra, note 20, at 205-16. See also H. Powell, 
“The Original Understanding of Original Intent” (1985) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885. 
24 See “The Misconceived Quest”, id., cited by Politics and the Constitution, id. 
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critical for differentiating between originalism in the United States and 
Canada because we are much closer in time to the original events. 
Patrick Monahan’s conclusion regarding the record of the view of the 
drafters is that they did not intend that their substantive views on the 
content of particular provisions of the Charter would be determinative of 
their constitutional meaning. Instead, Monahan contends that the 
interpretive intent of the framers can be described in terms of a 
“modified judicial realism” based on their analysis of how constitutional 
interpretation had developed in the United States.25 In the Canadian 
context, progressive interpretation in the form of “the living tree 
doctrine” is consistent with the interpretative intent of the framers.26 The 
clear intention of those who framed the Charter was that the courts break 
from the frozen rights theory that had marginalized the Bill of Rights. 
Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision was originalist in this sense of 
professing fidelity to this interpretive intent of the framers. It is therefore 
not at odds to claim Justice Wilson as an originalist at the same time as 
she was a proponent of purposive and contextual interpretation.  
Justice Wilson’s originalism is of the moderate variant. It does not 
require that judges be bound by the specific meaning of the document 
for those who gave it legal authority, but rather that they should be 
guided by the original understanding of the Charter at a higher level of 
abstraction. By this I mean “the motives, expectations, fears, and 
aspirations that surrounded the enactment of the document in 1982”.27 
This includes both the written record and the general context 
surrounding the enactment of the Charter. The written record includes 
the explicit discussion of the Charter found in the proceedings before 
Parliament, provincial legislatures and at the various federal-provincial 
meetings.28 The context includes the surrounding assumptions and 
concerns that informed the manner in which the framers and ratifiers 
thought about the issues in the Charter.29 Thus, the American 
Constitution can only be properly understood in contrast to the failure of 
                                                                                                             
25 Politics and the Constitution, id., at 78. 
26 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2007+) at 60.1(f) [hereinafter “Constitutional Law”] and Politics and the Constitution, id., 
at 78-82. 
27 Patrick J. Monahan, “The Charter Then and Now”, in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & 
John Russell, eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s 
Political, Legal and Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 105, at 106 
[hereinafter “‘The Charter Then and Now’”]. 
28 Cf. Original Meanings, supra, note 21, at 12. 
29 Id. 
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the Articles of Confederation.30 Similarly, the Charter can only be 
comprehended in contradistinction to the experience under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights where “[j]udicial intransigence to that statutory instrument, 
in the purported service of legislative sovereignty, paved the way for the 
constitutional entrenchment of rights.”31 These elements are part of the 
context of an originalist conception of the Charter that explains Justice 
Wilson’s jurisprudence on the relationship between rights and their 
limits under the Charter.  
This constitutional context forms the foundation for Justice Wilson’s 
originalist conception of the Charter. It is based on a particular 
interpretation of the historical events surrounding the enactment of the 
Charter which is contested. Critics of judicial review in the Canadian 
context draw heavily on American arguments for judicial restraint and 
against judicial review. However, the more that they do so, the weaker 
their protestations against judicial review under the Charter become. There 
are several critical distinctions between judicial review in the United 
States and Canada which limit the transfer north of anti-judicial review 
arguments from south of the border. First, the American Constitution is 
silent on judicial review whereas the Canadian Constitution explicitly 
sanctions it.32 Second, the Charter was enacted against the backdrop of the 
debate over the legitimacy of judicial review and judicial power in  
the United States and the liberal decisions of the Warren Court. Third, 
the Charter contains a legislative override of judicial review whereas the 
American Constitution does not. For these and other reasons, inter-
pretations of the events of 1982 which seek to preserve parliamentary 
sovereignty and tether the power of judicial review are problematic. 
Justice Wilson’s originalist conception of the Charter is based on a more 
solid foundation. Her constitutional vision contains a democratic con-
ception of originalism that goes beyond the Charter’s drafters and the 
                                                                                                             
30 Cf. Original Meanings, id., at 17 (stating that “[t]he only understanding we can be 
entirely confident that the majority of the ratifiers shared was that they were indeed deciding 
whether the Constitution would ‘form a more perfect union’ than the Articles of Confederation”). 
31 Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” 
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 471 [hereinafter “Section One and the Charter”]. 
32 See s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (providing that “[t]he Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect”). 
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framers to include the participants in the public debate between 1980 and 
1982.33 
2. Justice Wilson’s Vision of the Charter 
Justice Wilson’s view of the relationship between rights and their 
limits flows directly from her larger vision of the Charter, which is 
rooted in the twin concepts of liberalism and democracy. While Justice 
Wilson’s fidelity to a liberal vision of rights is widely accepted, the 
proposition that her vision of the Charter is a democratic one is 
strenuously contested.34 Both elements are originalist in the sense of 
being grounded in assertions regarding the context for the Charter’s 
enactment. On liberalism, she explained her view in a memorandum to 
Chief Justice Dickson in one case: “I tend to see the Charter as an anti-
majoritarian document and the role of the Court to ensure that minorities 
are not sacrificed to the majority will.”35 Her liberalism emphasized 
personal autonomy, revealed in her explanation that “[the Charter tells] 
us that there will be rights. These rights erect around each individual an 
invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The 
role of the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of these 
                                                                                                             
33 Whether Justice Wilson’s originalist conception is correct as a question of history is a 
matter that must be left for another day, given the subsequent academic neglect of the events of 
1980-1982. Robert Hawkins and Robert Martin argued strongly that Justice Wilson’s expansive 
view of the role of the courts under the Charter contradicts the view of the framers. See 
“Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4, at 29-33. The authors take a more narrow 
view of originalism than I do in this article, considering only the views of the politicians and 
government officials who were involved in the drafting of the Charter and excluding the views and 
the participation of the Canadians who appeared before the Joint Committee. The authors also fail to 
consider the significance of the changes that occurred to the text of s. 1. In fact, they consider the 
original federal draft of August 22, 1980 to be “more or less [s. 1’s] current form”. Id., at 31. This is 
a significant oversight which undercuts their argument. Further, Justice Wilson’s originalist view of 
the Charter is supported by Peter Hogg, who states that “in the case of Canada’s Charter of Rights, I 
think it is clear as a matter of fact that the original understanding of many of the framers of 1982 
was not that the Charter rights should be frozen in the shape that seemed good in 1982 but rather 
that the rights should be subject to changing judicial interpretations over time.” Constitutional Law, 
supra, note 26, at 36.8(a). See also Politics and the Constitution, supra, note 23, at 78. To the extent 
that I cite sources that confirm Justice Wilson’s assumptions or assertions, it is to show that her 
views have some support, not that they are necessarily correct as a matter of historical 
interpretatation. 
34 See, e.g., “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4. 
35 Robert J. Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2003), at 409. The case was R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
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fences.”36 This understanding of the purpose of the Charter, which 
privileges personal autonomy, is contestable and Justice Wilson has been 
criticized for failing to recognize and account for collectivist elements in 
the Charter.37 
The democratic component of Justice Wilson’s vision is more 
complicated and more disputed since her judgments have often been 
labelled “anti-democratic”.38 If one conceives of democracy as simply 
majoritarian rule and a democratic vision of the judicial role as deference 
to the expression of majoritarian preferences through the legislative 
process, then claiming Justice Wilson as a democrat is a lost cause. 
However, judicial deference to the will of the majority does not accord 
with the constitutional project, either. As is generally recognized, there is 
a tension between majoritarian democracy and the constitutionalization 
of rights.39 Justice Wilson’s democratic vision of the Charter may itself 
appear paradoxical but I attempt to explain it below. 
Justice Wilson saw the enactment of the Charter as a national 
political choice. In her view, Canada’s democratically elected Parliament 
had entrusted the courts with a mission — to uphold the Charter — and 
the courts had a duty to fulfil that mission. She saw the Charter as a 
transformative enterprise in the sense of its potential impact both on the 
institutions of government (the legislature, the executive and the courts) 
and on the lives of ordinary Canadians.40 To Justice Wilson, the 
legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter was a settled question. In 
her mind, the traditional argument against the legitimacy of judicial 
review based on the unrepresentative character of the judiciary was 
conclusively settled by the enactment of the Charter. In her words, the 
                                                                                                             
36 Wilson, supra, note 10, at 338. Justice Wilson later incorporated these words almost 
verbatim into her opinion in R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 17, at 164.  
37 See Robin M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — The Erosion of 
the Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 281. To the extent that her emphasis on personal 
autonomy clashed with the collectivist goals of s. 15, this tension has not been adequately reconciled 
by Justice Wilson and is beyond the scope of this article. See also McKinney v. University of 
Guelph, supra, note 17, at 356 (per Wilson J.) (stating that in Canada, freedom is not co-extensive 
with the absence of government; rather, freedom has often required the intervention and protection of 
government against private action). 
38 See “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson”, supra, note 4, especially at 57-58. 
39 See generally Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: The Paradox of 
Liberal Constitutionalism, 2d ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), at xii-xiii [hereinafter 
“Judicial Power and the Charter”] (explaining the tension between energetic self-government and 
individual liberty). 
40 That the Charter was intended to have transformative effects is again supported by the 
history of the making of the Charter, most notably by the inclusion of a three-year waiting period 
before s. 15 of the Charter was to come into effect.  
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government “bit the bullet, so to speak, in 1982 when it gave the courts 
the power to review legislation to make sure it complied with the 
constitution”.41 In less colloquial terms, she adopted the words of Justice 
Lamer (as he then was) in the Motor Vehicle Reference:  
. . . It ought not to be forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the 
Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the courts but by the 
elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those 
representatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication 
and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility. 
Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any 
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.42 
According to this view, the critics of judicial review took an 
ahistorical if not dehistorical view, neglecting the historical context for 
the Charter: the failure of the Bill of Rights, the hearings before the Joint 
Committee, the changes to section 1, the strengthening of the equality 
guarantee, etc. By the time she had stepped down from the Court, Justice 
Wilson was more blunt in expressing her position, stating that the time 
had come “to give the lie to some political commentators who still 
maintain that the advent of the Charter was a colossal ‘power grab’ by 
the courts”.43 She made the democratic claim that “Canadians decided to 
charge the courts with the onerous responsibility for reviewing 
legislative and executive action for compliance with the constitution” 
through a “widely accepted constitutional process”.44 All of this was 
done with “full knowledge of the American experience” and of the 
criticism of the power of the courts and the debate over judicial review.45 
This view finds support in leading members of the academy46 and was 
taken as an article of faith by Justice Wilson. 
                                                                                                             
41 Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts” (Seminar on the Functioning of 
Government: The Canadian Experience, Ottawa, May 30, 1991), in Speeches Delivered by the 
Honourable Bertha Wilson 1976-1991 (Ottawa: Supreme Court of Canada, 1992), 742, at 744 
[hereinafter “Speeches”]. Professor Hogg notes that “[t]he courts have assumed that the 
constitutional status of the Charter resolves their former uncertainty as to the legitimacy of judicial 
review” under the Bill of Rights. Constitutional Law, supra, note 26, at 35.5. 
42 Motor Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 (S.C.C.), 
quoted by Bertha Wilson, “Law and Policy in a Court of Last Resort” in Frank E. McArdle, ed., The 
Cambridge Lectures (Montreal: Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, 1990) 219, at 223. 
43 Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 9. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg, “The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation” 
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 87, at 88; “Section One and the Charter”, supra, note 31. 
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Justice Wilson’s vision accounts for and credits the role of the many 
Canadians who appeared before the Special Joint Committee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution (“Joint 
Committee”) in the fall of 1980 through the winter of 1981. It is 
contrasted with a more cynical view which dismisses the Joint 
Committee as the political handiwork of the federal government 
designed to strengthen its hand against the recalcitrant provinces.47 
Justice Wilson’s vision of the Charter implicitly recognizes and values 
the multiplicity of voices that contributed to the enactment (or “the 
framing”) of the Charter. Whatever the government’s intention in 
establishing the Joint Committee, it is clear that the parliamentary 
hearings took on a dynamic of their own. As described in one of the 
popular contemporary accounts of those events: 
In the fall of 1980, in a chandeliered ballroom in Parliament’s West 
Block, the Liberal government lost control of its constitutional 
strategy. The centerpiece — the candy-coloured charter of rights and 
freedoms that was to be the prize in Trudeau’s reform package — was 
wrenched from the cool hands of the government planners, and taken 
over by ordinary Canadians and parliamentary backbenchers.48  
The participation of many Canadians before the Joint Committee led 
to critical changes to the text of several provisions of the Charter, 
including the limitations clause. Justice Wilson’s conception of the 
relationship between rights and limits can only be appreciated against 
this background. 
The strictness of Justice Wilson’s approach to section 1 can be 
directly tied to the proceedings and the product of the Joint Committee 
process. In the proceedings before the Joint Committee, the limitations 
clause became the focus of much attack; it was the most criticized 
section of the Charter.49 As detailed by key participants in the 
constitutional debates of those years, the original limitations clause from 
the federal government’s August 1980 draft of the Charter was clearly 
“designed to encourage judicial deference to legislative choices even 
                                                                                                             
47 For examples of this view see, e.g., Judicial Power and the Charter, supra, note 39, at xiv. 
48 Robert Sheppard & Michael Valpy, The National Deal (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), at 
135 [hereinafter “The National Deal”]. But see Edward McWhinney, Canada and the Constitution 
1979-1982: Patriation and the Charter of Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), at 57 
[hereinafter “Canada and the Constitution”] (asserting that the testimony before the Joint 
Committee had little impact). 
49 The National Deal, id., at 149. 
344 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
though they affected civil liberties”.50 Such a limitations clause appealed 
to those who opposed the constitutional entrenchment of the Charter as, 
in some ways, superior even to a notwithstanding clause.51 The text of 
the limitations clause that was referred to the Joint Committee in 
October 1980 provided: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits as are 
generally accepted in a free and democratic society with a 
parliamentary system of government.52 
This text was viewed as a further concession to the interests of the 
provinces “in building into the charter as large an element of judicial 
deference to legislative choices as possible”.53 This was the first public 
draft of the Charter and of section 1 and “[w]omen’s groups, civil 
liberties organizations, ethnic and racial minorities, the disabled 
community, and even Canada’s human rights commissioner all urged the 
federal government to go back to the drawing-board and produce a 
Charter that would have real teeth”.54 
The result of their successful campaign produced changes to the 
Charter, including the limitations clause, which was redrafted to include 
the text that is now enshrined in section 1.55 Notably, the phrases 
“prescribed by law” and “demonstrably justified” were added and the 
reference to “a parliamentary system of government” was dropped. The 
phrase “demonstrably justified” reflected the concerns of witnesses 
before the Joint Committee that the burden of proof of limiting rights 
                                                                                                             
50 Roy Romanow, John Whyte & Howard Leeson, Canada . . . Notwithstanding: The 
Making of the Constitution 1976-1982 (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 243 [hereinafter 
“Canada … Notwithstanding”]. 
51 Id.  
52 Draft of October 1980, reproduced as “Appendix A (Proposed Resolution — First 
Draft)” in McWhinney, supra, note 48, at 142. Appendix A is also contained in Anne F. Bayefsky, 
Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. II (Toronto: 
McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1989) 743, at 745-46 [hereinafter “Canada’s Constitution Act 1982”]. 
53 Canada … Notwithstanding, supra, note 50, at 245. 
54 “The Charter Then and Now”, supra, note 27, at 109. 
55 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 
650 (noting that the change to s. 1 tended to narrow the focus of the limitation clause and by indirect 
means to broaden the rights guarantees); Joseph E. Magnet, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1983), at 663 (noting that the original draft of s. 1 was unacceptable and was redrafted); 
and Timothy J. Christian, “The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms” (1982) (Charter Edition) U.B.C. L. Rev. 105, at 107 [hereinafter “‘The 
Limitation of Liberty’”]. 
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should properly rest on the government.56 Thus, when then-Minister of 
Justice Jean Chrétien returned before the Committee in his “we have 
listened and we have heard you” testimony on January 12, 1981 in which 
he tabled an amended version of the Charter with the Committee, 
Chrétien declared: 
You have been told over and over again that Canadians want a strong 
Charter . . . You have been told by many witnesses that Canadians are 
not satisfied with the type of compromise which weakens the 
effectiveness of constitutional protection of human rights and 
freedoms. I accept the legitimacy of that criticism.57 
Chrétien claimed that the proposed new wording for section 1 was 
even more stringent than that suggested by some of the leading critics 
who appeared as witnesses before the Joint Committee.58 The 
explanatory notes to the new, more robust section 1 stated:  
The proposed amendment would narrow the limits that could be placed 
on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. For a right to be 
limited, the limitation would be required to be prescribed by law and to 
be both reasonable and capable of being demonstrably justified.59  
In the words of some of the leading participants in the events of 
1980-1982 who would clearly be considered framers, “[i]f these changes 
to section 1 were applied literally, claims by governments that their 
limitation on individual rights were reasonable would face a tough 
test.”60  
In addition, the inclusion of the notwithstanding clause played an 
important role in Justice Wilson’s democratic vision, although it 
operated mostly in the background of her constitutional mindset. Writing 
in 1988 while still on the Court, Justice Wilson hedged her position on 
the notwithstanding clause, stating that it would be hard to predict the 
impact of section 33 on Charter interpretation: 
                                                                                                             
56 The National Deal, supra, note 48, at 149-50. 
57 Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on 
the Constitution, January 12, 1981, 36:10 (Testimony of Minister of Justice Jean Chrétien). 
58 Id., at 36:11. 
59 See Explanatory Notes to January 12, 1981 draft of the Charter, contained in Robin 
Elliot, “Interpreting the Charter — Use of Earlier Versions as an Aid” (1982) (Charter Edition) 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 11, at 24. For side-by-side comparison of the two versions of s. 1, see Canada’s 
Constitution Act 1982, supra, note 52, at 766. 
60 Canada … Notwithstanding, supra, note 50, at 251. 
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Perhaps Canada’s courts will be more venturesome in finding that 
inviolable human rights exist, secure in the knowledge that their word 
is less final than their United States’ counterparts. Perhaps they will be 
less venturesome, feeling that their authority as a Court will be eroded 
by frequent governmental resort to the notwithstanding clause.61  
A decade later, after she had retired from the Court, Justice Wilson 
was less restrained in her comments. In “We Didn’t Volunteer”, she 
articulated a robust role for the courts, grounded in the legitimacy of the 
democratic process that produced the Charter. Section 33 fit into this 
scheme by providing a mechanism for preserving parliamentary 
sovereignty if and when governments have the political will to use it.62 
In the formative years of the Charter which coincided with Justice 
Wilson’s tenure on the Court, the existence of the notwithstanding 
mechanism loomed large in constitutional thinking. After it was invoked 
by the Quebec government following the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in December 1988 in the Ford case,63 the notwithstanding 
clause quickly became politically illegitimate outside of Quebec.64 
However, the notwithstanding clause was part of the mix that 
contributed to Justice Wilson’s constitutional thinking while she 
developed and articulated her thoughts about the relationship between 
rights and their limits under the Charter. 
The drafting process was “a battleground” between pro and anti-
Charter forces and the Joint Committee process produced significant 
changes to strengthen section 1.65 It was widely recognized, even by its 
critics, that the Charter would profoundly alter the existing relationship 
between courts and legislatures and notably alter the role of the Supreme 
Court.66 The efforts at the Joint Committee and afterwards to strengthen 
the Charter in 1980-1982 were important in sending a message to the 
                                                                                                             
61 Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (April-May, 1988) 71:6 Judicature 334, 
at 336. 
62 See Bertha Wilson, “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8, at 11. 
63 Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.). 
64 Arguably in the 20 years since Ford, id., a convention has developed against the use of 
the notwithstanding clause. On the rise and decline of the notwithstanding clause, see Judicial 
Power and the Charter, supra, note 39, at 181-88. 
65 See Lorraine E. Weinrib, Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost? (2002) 6 Review 
of Constitutional Studies 119, at 136, 139. 
66 See, e.g., Canada and the Constitution, supra, note 48, at ix (criticizing the federal 
government for failing to be more explicit in this respect). See generally Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 652-53 (noting that a major 
effect of the Charter would be an expansion of judicial review and that this responsibility would be 
“a formidable task” for the courts). 
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judiciary about the nature of the Charter as a rights-protecting document 
to be taken seriously.67 Justice Wilson not only heard this message but 
she served as its most vocal proponent. 
III. CHAMPION OF THE OAKES FRAMEWORK 
1. Section 1 as the Battleground for the Charter’s Soul 
Section 1 has become the focus of attention for much of the debate 
over the appropriate role of the courts under the Charter. It is critical to 
Hogg and Bushell’s dialogue theory,68 which has dominated discussions 
about constitutional interpretation in Canada since 1997 and succeeded in 
capturing the Court’s attention as well.69 The importance of the limitations 
clause was recognized during the drafting process before the Joint 
Committee and has rightly been called “the pivotal provision in the 
Charter”.70 Writing the year after Oakes, Robin Elliot correctly predicted 
                                                                                                             
67 See “The Charter Then and Now”, in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & John Russell, eds., 
Protecting Rights and Freedoms: Essays on the Charter’s Place in Canada’s Political, Legal and 
Intellectual Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) 105, at 119. 
68 See Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and 
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. Hogg and Bushell updated their theory in 2007. See Peter W. Hogg, Alison 
A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much Ado About 
Metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
69 Hogg and Bushell’s dialogue theory spawned a cottage industry of commentary. See F.L. 
Morton, “Dialogue or Monologue?” (1999) 20(3) Policy Options 23; Janet L. Hiebert, “Why Must a 
Bill of Rights Be a Contest of Political and Judicial Wills?” (1999) 10 Public Law Review 22; 
Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and 
Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 513; Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Thornton, “Reply to ‘Six 
Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. To commemorate the 10th anniversary of 
the Hogg and Bushell article, the Osgoode Hall Law Journal dedicated a special edition to “Charter 
Dialogue: Ten Years Later” led off by Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell & Wade K. Wright, 
“Charter Dialogue Revisited — Or “‘Much Ado About Metaphors’”, id. This volume includes 
commentaries by Richard Haigh and Michael Sobkin, Christopher Manfredi, Carissima Mathen, 
Andrew Petter and Kent Roach, as well as a reply from Hogg, Bushell and Wright. The Supreme 
Court of Canada has embraced the concept of dialogue. See, e.g., Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at paras. 137-39, 178 (S.C.C.); M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 3, at para. 328 (S.C.C.); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 24, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 116 (S.C.C.); R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at paras. 20, 57, 125 (S.C.C.); Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R 1120, at para. 268 (S.C.C.); Bell 
ExpressVu v. Rex, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 65-66 (S.C.C.); Harper v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at para. 37 (S.C.C.). 
70 Robin M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — The Erosion of the 
Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 279 [hereinafter “‘The Supreme Court and Section 
1’”]. See also “Paradigm Lost?”), supra, note 65, at 120 (terming s. 1 the “centerpiece of the new 
constitutional arrangement”). 
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that section 1 was “likely to become the focal point of debate about the 
proper scope of judicial review”.71 In more dramatic terms, one 
commentator writing in 1982 prophesized that section 1 was “the tool with 
which the fragile freedoms contained in the Charter . . . will be cultivated 
or nipped in the bud”.72 Section 1 is a window into the judicial soul. Its 
interpretation not only reveals the impact of the Charter on other branches 
of government but also tells us “about the Court itself and how it perceives 
its role under the Charter”.73 Justice Wilson correctly identified section 1 
as the fault line between liberal and conservative approaches to the role of 
the courts. She saw the essential question as being “when is it permissible 
to sacrifice individual or minority rights in order to achieve what is 
perceived by government [i.e., the majority] to be the common good?”74 
Justice Wilson clearly saw section 1 as the vehicle for the Court to carry 
out its mission under the Charter. 
The Supreme Court’s development of the Oakes test and its 
subsequent adaptation or relaxation in cases such as Edwards Books75 
and Irwin Toy76 are well documented and not repeated here.77 For our 
purposes, we are interested in analyzing Justice Wilson’s role in this 
process as it sheds light on her view of the relationship between rights 
and their limits under the Charter. Her position was clear: she saw other 
members of the Court desiring to replace the strict standard of review 
under Oakes with a much more deferential standard of “reasonableness”.78 
This she was unwilling to do and she was prepared to and did fight it 
every step of the way, both on and off the Court. 
                                                                                                             
71 “The Supreme Court and Section 1”, id., at 293. R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 
1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
72 “The Limitation of Liberty”, supra, note 55, at 105. 
73 “The Supreme Court and Section 1”, supra, note 70, at 279. 
74 Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts” (Seminar on the Functioning of 
Government: the Canadian Experience, Ottawa, May 30, 1991), Speeches, supra, note 41, 742, at 
746. 
75 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Edwards Books”]. 
76 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 
(S.C.C.). 
77 See especially “The Supreme Court and Section 1”, supra, note 70; Lorraine E. Weinrib, 
“The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469. See 
generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007+) 
at 38.11(b). 
78 Bertha Wilson, “Human Rights and the Courts”, Speeches, supra, note 41, 742, at 747. 
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2. Mission Instructions: The Oakes Framework and the Oakes Test  
Justice Wilson frequently began her limitations analysis by quoting 
section 1 in its entirety. She did so even in her last judgments,79 eight 
years after the Charter had come into force and the contents of that 
section had become well known to jurists and lawyers, and to a new 
generation of law students. However, by quoting section 1, Justice 
Wilson was emphasizing the entirety of its contents — that the Charter 
guaranteed the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.80 By the time of her final year on the Court, 
she openly acknowledged the existence of two separate and distinct 
limitations analyses. The first was Oakes — the original framework 
developed in that case — and the second was a more relaxed limitations 
analysis.81 To her, the “original” Oakes test was the default and the 
relaxed application was the exception, much like her view of the 
relationship between rights and their limits. 
Justice Wilson’s originalist understanding manifested itself in her 
approach to section 1. She began to articulate her conception of the sharp 
delineation between rights and their limits prior to Oakes. Much of 
Justice Wilson’s commentary regarding section 1 foreshadowed the 
framework set out by the Court in Oakes. In Operation Dismantle, she 
stated that “[t]he rights under the Charter not being absolute, their 
content or scope must be discerned quite apart from any limitation 
sought to be imposed upon them by the government under s. 1.”82 She 
developed this point in Singh83 and reiterated it post-Oakes in R. v. 
Jones.84  
In Singh, Justice Wilson explained that the rights and freedoms set 
out in the Charter “are fundamental to the political structure of Canada 
and are guaranteed by the Charter as part of the supreme law of our 
nation”.85 She then continued, expressing the idea of the courts’ duty 
under the Charter, noting that it was “important to remember that the 
                                                                                                             
79 See, e.g., Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 483, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 700, at para. 34 (S.C.C.). 
80 On the duality of s. 1, see “Paradigm Lost?”, supra, note 65. 
81 See Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 79, at 553. 
82 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, at 489 
(S.C.C.). 
83 Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). 
84 [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at para. 18 (S.C.C.). 
85 Singh, supra, note 83, at 218. 
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courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a commitment to uphold the 
rights and freedoms set out in other sections of the Charter”.86 This 
would become a frequent theme in Justice Wilson’s judgments. 
Justice Wilson recognized the tension inherent in the limitations 
process. Articulating the dilemma of adjudication under section 1, she 
stated that if too low a threshold was set, the courts would run the risk of 
“emasculating the Charter” while if too high a threshold was set, the 
courts would run the risk of “unjustifiably restricting government 
action”.87 And in a critical precursor to the analysis in Oakes,88 Justice 
Wilson stated that the question was not whether the government action 
was reasonable but whether it was reasonable to deprive an individual of 
their Charter rights in the particular context.89 Many of the themes of 
Singh would make their way into Justice Dickson’s judgment in Oakes.  
In discussing Oakes, we need to differentiate between its three 
different meanings: (1) the Oakes case; (2) the Oakes framework; and 
(3) the Oakes test. The Oakes case is straightforward. It refers to the 
Court’s examination of the issue of whether the reverse onus provision 
in the Narcotic Control Act concerning possession for purposes of 
trafficking offends the presumption of innocence protected by section 
11(d) of the Charter. This is the narrowest meaning of Oakes and the 
least important jurisprudentially. The most frequent meaning of Oakes is 
the Oakes test consisting of the well-known formula for conducting the 
limitations analysis under section 1: (1) the objective must be pressing 
and substantial in a free and democratic society; (2) the means chosen 
must be proportional to the objective, i.e. (a) they must be rationally 
connected to the objective; (b) they should impair the right “as little as 
possible”; and (c) there must be a proportionality between the effects of 
the measures limiting the right and the objective.90 This is only part of 
the larger Oakes framework which has generally been overshadowed and 
largely overlooked by the Oakes test. The Oakes framework provides the 
                                                                                                             
86 Id., at 218. 
87 Id., at 217. 
88 Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” 
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 483-88. 
89 Singh, supra, note 83, at para. 218. The issue in Singh was whether it was reasonable to 
deprive an individual of his or her right to life, liberty and security of the person by adopting a 
system for the adjudication of refugee claims which does not accord with the principles of 
fundamental justice. Id. 
90 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 139 as modified by Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, at 889 (S.C.C.). See generally Peter W. Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007+) at 38.12. 
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guidelines and the context for how the Oakes test should be applied, as 
described below. The critical distinction between Justice Wilson and her 
colleagues was that they tended to focus on the Oakes test whereas she 
focused on the Oakes framework. The gap between Justice Wilson and 
the other justices grew as they began to relax elements of the Oakes test 
and to ignore the rest of the Oakes framework while she continued to be 
faithful to the latter, including insisting on the strict application of the 
former. I develop the distinction between the Oakes test and the 
framework below. 
Oakes was a rare Charter case where Justice Wilson did not write 
separately. While joining the majority decision of Dickson C.J.C., 
Wilson J. quickly assumed ownership of Oakes — both the test and the 
framework — and became its most ardent defender on the Court. The 
Oakes test is set out above. It is important to understand the framework 
which surrounded it, as it is often overlooked and because it provides the 
basis for Justice Wilson’s limitations analysis during her tenure on the 
Court. In Oakes, the introduction to the section 1 test begins by 
reproducing the text of section 1 (as Wilson J. often did) and noting the 
dual functions of section 1: “first, it constitutionally guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in the provisions which follow; and second, it states 
explicitly the exclusive justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 . . .) against 
which limitations on those rights and freedoms must be measured”.91 
Then, drawing on Wilson J.’s statement in Singh that “it is important to 
remember that the courts are conducting this inquiry in light of a 
commitment to uphold the rights and freedoms set out in the other 
sections of the Charter”,92 Dickson C.J.C. emphasized that any section 1 
inquiry “must be premised on an understanding that the impugned limit 
violates constitutional rights and freedoms”.93 After proceeding to review 
the criteria of “a free and democratic society”, Dickson C.J.C. concluded 
that these criteria “impose a stringent standard of justification, especially 
when understood in terms of the two contextual considerations discussed 
above, namely, the violation of a constitutionally-guaranteed right or 
freedom and the fundamental principles of a free and democratic 
society”. Turning next to the question of onus, Dickson C.J.C. stated that 
it was clear from the text of section 1 that limits are exceptions and that 
the presumption is that “the rights and freedoms are guaranteed unless 
                                                                                                             
91 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135. 
92 Singh, supra, note 83, at 218. 
93 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135. 
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the party invoking s. 1 can bring itself within the exceptional criteria 
which justify [Oakes] their being limited”.94 The primacy of the default 
to rights rule was expressed through the Oakes framework. 
On the standard of proof, Dickson C.J.C. determined that it was to 
be the civil standard of a preponderance of probabilities but that standard 
was to be “rigorously” applied.95 Again, he found support for this 
conclusion in the use of the phrase “demonstrably justified” in section 1. 
On the important question of evidence to meet the constituent elements 
of the Oakes test, Dickson C.J.C. noted first that evidence would 
generally be required and that it “should be cogent and persuasive and 
make clear to the court the consequences of imposing or not imposing 
the limit”.96 The Oakes framework is consistent with an originalist 
understanding of section 1 and of the Charter. In fact, the framework 
was predicted by some of the key framers of the Charter, who stated that 
the insertion of the phrase “demonstrably justified” appeared “to impose 
a burden on governments to impose actual evidence of the need to limit 
rights instead of relying on a more abstract claim that the legislation 
under challenge was within a range of acceptable responses to the social 
situation”.97 This originalist description accurately describes the Oakes 
framework and contrasts Justice Wilson’s steadfast adherence to it with 
its abandonment by other members of the Court in favour of a relaxed 
application of the Oakes test. Despite such predictions by some framers, 
Justice Wilson frequently found herself alone in applying the Oakes 
framework.  
3. Going It Alone: Applying the Oakes Framework 
(a) Section 1 as the Sole Source of Limits 
Consistent with her originalist conception and her fidelity to the 
Oakes framework, Justice Wilson saw section 1 as the sole source of 
limits on Charter rights. Chief Justice Dickson had expressed as much in 
Oakes itself.98 To Justice Wilson there were always two important 
                                                                                                             
94 Id., at 137. 
95 Id., at 137. 
96 Id., at 138. Chief Justice Dickson did recognize that there might be cases where certain 
elements of the s. 1 analysis are obvious or self-evident. 
97 See Canada . . . Notwithstanding (Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1984), at 250. 
98 R. v. Oakes, supra, note 71, at 135 (noting that s. 1 states explicitly “the exclusive 
justificatory criteria (outside of s. 33 … ) against which limitations on those rights and freedoms 
must be measured.”). 
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assumptions operating in the background as she opined on this issue. 
The first was her vision of the Charter as set out above — specifically 
that rights are the norm and limits the exception. Second, Justice Wilson 
viewed section 33 as another legitimate mechanism available to limit 
rights. She saw section 1 as the sole source of judicial limits on rights 
and section 33 as an available legislative source to limit rights.99 She 
developed the position that section 1 is the sole source of limits on rights 
in a number of cases. 
In the early case of Operation Dismantle,100 Justice Wilson would 
not accept the position that certain government activity could be beyond 
the reach of the Charter. In rejecting the political questions doctrine, she 
refused to place an external limit on the types of issues amenable to 
judicial review. In her words, the Court was obliged under the Charter to 
examine such issues and if they were determined to violate an 
individual’s right to life and liberty under section 7, then the only way to 
limit the infringed rights was through section 1.101 Similarly, in Canada 
v. Schmidt,102 the Court held that section 11(h) of the Charter did not 
have extraterritorial effect and thus did not apply to extradition 
proceedings. Justice Wilson disagreed with this, stating that “Charter 
rights which are enshrined in our Constitution as part of the supreme law 
of Canada must be recognized and given effect in any judicial 
proceeding in Canada unless a reasonable limit under s. 1 has been 
imposed upon them.”103  
                                                                                                             
99 Justice Wilson’s views on s. 33, generally referred to as “the notwithstanding clause”, 
are beyond the scope of this paper. She concurred in Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, 
note 63, which dealt with s. 33. It is fair to say that s. 33 remained a real rather than a remote option 
during her tenure on the Court when she was developing and applying her view of rights and their 
limits. Since Justice Wilson retired from the Court in 1991, no government has used this section to 
“limit” or “override” a Charter right and the notwithstanding clause has become politically 
illegitimate, so much so that a desperate Prime Minister Paul Martin promised during the 2006 
election to enact federal legislation to prohibit its use. See “Martin wraps campaign in constitutional 
pledge”, CBC News (January 10, 2006), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/ 
national/2006/01/09/elxn-debates-look.html>. See also Paul Wells, Right Side Up: The Fall of Paul 
Martin and the Rise of Stephen Harper’s New Conservatism (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2006), at 
220-22. 
100 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, supra, note 82. 
101 Id., at paras. 64-65. As discussed below in part III.4, later that year in the Motor Vehicle 
Reference, Wilson J. adopted the view that a violation of s. 7 could not be saved under s. 1. See 
Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 
523 (S.C.C.). 
102 [1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.). 
103 Id., at 533. See also Argentina (Republic) v. Mellino, [1987] S.C.J. No. 25, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 536, at 561 (S.C.C.) (per Wilson J., concurring) and United States of America v. Allard, 
[1987] S.C.J. No. 20, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, at 576 (S.C.C.) (per Wilson J., concurring). 
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She did not support reading internal limits or qualifications into the 
plain language of enumerated rights because this usurped the role of 
section 1 and collapsed the two-stage analysis into a single-stage one. 
Thus, in R. v. Strachan,104 a case involving the right to counsel under 
section 10(b), the Court interpreted “the right to instruct and retain 
counsel without delay” as providing time for police, upon their entry into 
a home with knowledge that weapons were located on the premises, to 
get “matters under control” before allowing the person arrested to call a 
lawyer. In Justice Wilson’s mind, this had the effect of reading a 
qualification or limit into section 10(b) which was simply not there; the 
Court read “the phrase ‘without delay’ as ‘without unreasonable 
delay’”.105 It had taken 40 minutes for the police to get matters under 
control. Justice Wilson acknowledged that while this justification might 
have been necessary under the particular circumstances of the case, it 
was not a norm that the courts were free to substitute for the 
constitutional standard of “without delay”. Justice Wilson saw this 
implied qualification as a slippery slope and chastised the Court for 
removing “all certainty as to the citizen’s rights under section 10(b)” in a 
manner that was also “completely inconsistent with its plain words and 
purpose”.106 
Justice Wilson’s concern with reading in implied limitations was 
that the Oakes framework could be rendered inoperative and the end 
result would be reduced rights protection. In a passage that reflects her 
background assumptions on the relationship between rights and their 
limits, Wilson J. stated that “[i]t would be unfortunate indeed if the 
exception were to become the rule and one of the fundamental rights of 
the citizen was to be so easily gainsaid.”107 To Justice Wilson, section 1 
was the sole source of reasonable limits which had to be prescribed by 
law and not imposed by the police in their discretion.108 
Moreover, reading in qualifiers flew in the face of Justice Wilson’s 
original understanding of the Charter. By reading in a “reasonableness” 
requirement to the definition of the right, the Court was effectively 
returning to the text of section 1 as originally referred to the Joint 
Committee prior to its amendment and ultimate enactment. Such a move 
                                                                                                             
104 [1988] S.C.J. No. 94, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (S.C.C.). 
105 Id., at 1010 (per Wilson J., concurring). 
106 Id., at 1011 (per Wilson J., concurring). 
107 Id., at 1013. 
108 See R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R 613, at 621 (S.C.C.). 
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can be viewed as anti-democratic in a number of ways. It rendered the 
work of the Joint Committee respecting section 1 — both of its members 
and of the witnesses who appeared before it — a nullity. It implicitly 
overrode the amendment brought forth by Minister of Justice Chrétien, 
embraced by the Joint Committee and ultimately endorsed by joint 
resolution of the House of Commons and the Senate. The effect of 
reading in a reasonableness requirement is to ignore the requirement of 
“demonstrably justified” and do an end run around the original 
understanding of section 1 and arguably of the Charter as well.109  
Justice Wilson resisted other attempts to import limiting criteria into 
the right-definition stage. For example, in R. v. Turpin,110 she clearly 
distinguished between the individual rights protecting nature of the right 
to a jury trial under section 11(f) and any collective societal interest in 
limiting that right, whose proper place was to be found under section 
1.111 She stated that “[t]o prevent an individual from waiving his or her 
right to the benefit of a jury trial is clearly to elevate the interests of 
society over the interests of the individual. This is normally achieved 
through the application of s. 1 and not through reading a limit into the 
right itself.”112  
Justice Wilson’s comments about the relationship between section 15 
and section 1 also reveal the mischief about which she was concerned by 
reading in internal qualifiers to enumerated rights. In Andrews,113 McIntyre 
J. addressed the relationship between sections 15 and 1. Justice Wilson 
agreed with his comments that consideration of any limiting factors take 
place under section 1, not under section 15. It was important to keep them 
analytically distinct if for no other reason than the burden of proof: “It is 
for the citizen to establish that his or her Charter right has been infringed 
and for the state to justify the infringement.”114 In R. v. Turpin,115 Wilson J. 
twice repeated that each equality right (the right to the equal protection and 
equal benefit of the law without discrimination) should be given “its full 
independent content, divorced from any justificatory factors applicable 
                                                                                                             
109 This is the sort of example where terms like “judicial activist” and “legislative 
deference” become highly contestable concepts. 
110 [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.). 
111 Id., at 1310-11. 
112 Id., at 1320. 
113 Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
(S.C.C.). 
114 Id., at 178, per McIntyre J. 
115 Supra, note 110. 
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under s. 1 … ”.116 Quoting McIntyre J.’s statements above with approval, 
she disapproved of attempts to read in limitations to the right to equality 
under section 15 through the development of tests of whether a particular 
distinction was “unreasonable”, “invidious”, “unfair” or “irrational”. In 
Wilson J.’s view, such tests imported limitations into section 15 which 
simply did not exist in the text.117  
Justice Wilson was arguably not always wholly consistent. Her 
decision in R. v. Jones118 has often puzzled commentators. In this case 
she disagreed with the majority that Alberta’s requirement that all 
school-aged children attend school unless they attend an approved 
private school or obtain certification that efficient schooling is occurring 
elsewhere violated the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of religion. She 
held that the claimant had failed to demonstrate “any substantial impact” 
of the impugned legislation on his religious belief.119 Justice Wilson 
openly acknowledged that this sort of determination could be dealt with 
under section 1 rather than in the definition of the right under section 2; 
however, she asserted that the content and scope of Charter rights must 
be discerned separate from any limitation imposed upon them under 
section 1.120 It may be easy to conclude that in R. v. Jones Justice Wilson 
failed to live up to her own standards which she so steadfastly 
                                                                                                             
116 Id., at 1325. 
117 Id., at 1328. Given such statements, it is hard to see how Wilson J. would have approved 
of the Law test. See Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 
12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.). This case has been much criticized. See, e.g., Donna Greschner, 
“Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299; Sheilah Martin, 
“Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299; Donna 
Greschner, “The Purpose of Canadian Equality Rights” (2002) 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 291; Debra M. 
McAllister, “Section 15 — The Unpredictability of the Law Test” (2003-2004) 15 N.J.C.L. 3; 
Christopher D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm 
for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33; Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 
15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 627; Daniel Proulx, “Le concept de dignité et son usage en 
contexte de discrimination: deux Chartes, deux modèles”, [2003] R. du B. (numéro spécial) 485; 
Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms 
Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111; Christian Brunelle, “La dignité dans la 
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne : de l’ubiquité à l’ambiguïté d’une notion 
fondamentale”, in La Charte québécoise : origines, enjeux et perspectives (2006), numéro 
thématique de la Revue du Barreau en marge du trentième anniversaire de l’entrée en vigueur de la 
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, sous la direction de Me Alain-Robert Nadeau, 143; R. 
James Fyfe, “Dignity as Theory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court 
of Canada” (2007) 70 Sask. L. Rev. 1; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed. 
2007), vol. 2, at 55-28 and 55-29; Alexandre Morin, Le droit à l’égalité au Canada (2008), at 80-82. 
118 [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.). 
119 Id., at 315. 
120 Id., at 314 quoting Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 
S.C.R. 441, at 489 (S.C.C.). 
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pronounced during her years on the Court.121 However, her judgment 
also demonstrates the difference between purposive interpretation and a 
“large and liberal” interpretation and how that connects with her liberal 
vision of personal autonomy, epitomized by her metaphor of the task of 
the judiciary to map out the parameters of the invisible fences that 
surround each individual over which the state will not be allowed to 
trespass.122  
(b) “Demonstrably Justified”: Onus and Evidence 
We have seen so far how the words “demonstrably justified” were 
added to section 1 through the Joint Committee process and how in 
Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. referenced them to explain the evidentiary 
requirements and the onus of proof for the limitations analysis.123 True to 
Justice Wilson’s vigilance in upholding the Oakes framework, onus and 
evidence were frequent themes in her judgments. She applied the Oakes 
framework faithfully in Edwards Books, a case that followed soon after 
Oakes and is often characterized in terms of a relaxation or a retreat from 
the strictness of Oakes, described in more detail in the next section. She 
dissented, in part because of the failure of the Crown to adduce sufficient 
evidence to justify its disparate treatment of Saturday Sabbath observers. 
She chastised the Crown for failing to adduce any evidence that would 
establish that allowing retailers who chose on religious grounds to close 
on Saturdays to remain open on Sundays would cause substantial 
disruption to Sunday as the uniform day of rest. She further rejected as 
speculative the assertion that allowing such a policy would motivate 
other retailers to close on Saturdays in order to open on Sundays. 
Expressing a sense of judicial frustration, she concluded on this point 
that “[w]e simply do not know. . . . [T]he Crown failed totally to 
discharge its burden under s. 1 . . .”.124 
                                                                                                             
121 For a view in this respect, see David M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The 
Canadian Production of Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), at 85-86, 106. 
122 Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution” (1988) 71 Judicature 334, at 338. Justice 
Wilson later incorporated these words almost verbatim into her opinion in Morgentaler. See R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 164 (S.C.C.). See also Lavigne v. Ontario 
Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (holding that freedom of 
expression was not violated). 
123 On the importance of onus and burden of proof under the Oakes test, see Sujit Choudhry, 
“So What is The Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the 
Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501. 
124 Edwards Books, [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 810 (S.C.C.). 
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She repeated the twin themes of onus and evidence under the Oakes 
framework time and again and was demanding in their fulfillment. In 
Jones, the case where Justice Wilson had found no violation of freedom 
of religion, the majority found that that right had been infringed but was 
saved under section 1. Justice Wilson took the government to task for 
failing to adduce any evidence that the impugned government policy was 
the least drastic means to accomplish the desired objective.125 Similarly, 
in R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,126 Justice Wilson emphasized that the 
onus rested with the government to establish the purported objective and 
that it required evidence to establish it. She found no evidence to support 
the allegations that dairy workers provide an essential service, the 
delivery of important food products to the consumer, and that the 
cessation of such delivery might threaten the health of part of the 
population.127  
Justice Wilson’s fidelity to the evidentiary requirements of the 
Oakes framework did not wane five years after Oakes with retirement on 
the horizon. Thus, in Thomson Newspapers,128 she expressed a concern 
about the level of proof required in order for the government to meet its 
onus. She reminded the Court that “[t]he government’s onus under 
Oakes is to justify the limit on the right of the citizen on a preponderance 
of probability. Dickson C.J. referred to this as ‘a very high degree of 
probability’ commensurate with the occasion.”129 Similarly, in Stoffman 
v. Vancouver General Hospital,130 she stated that where there was a 
serious question “as to whether a pressing concern as alleged in fact 
exists, it is incumbent on the party bearing the burden of proof under s. 1 
to establish the pressing and substantial concern”.131 Continuing, she 
opined that where the party carrying the burden of proof failed to adduce 
evidence to support its assertion, the first branch of the Oakes test could 
not be met.132 In the next part, we see the strictness of these aspects of 
the framework at work when applied to the components of the Oakes 
test. 
                                                                                                             
125 Supra, note 118, at 315. 
126 R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “R.W.D.S.U.”]. 
127 Id., at 494. 
128 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.). 
129 Id., at 487. 
130 [1990] S.C.J. No. 125, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, 76 D.L.R. (4th) 700 (S.C.C.). 
131 Id., at 550. 
132 Id. 
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(c) Pressing and Substantial Objective 
The requirement that there be a pressing and substantial objective is 
the element of the Oakes test that has attracted minimal scholarly interest 
and arguably does the least analytical work. During Justice Wilson’s 
tenure on the Court, the only instances where the Court found that this 
requirement was not satisfied were in the pre-Oakes cases of Singh and 
Big M Drug Mart.133 Not surprisingly, Justice Wilson refused to take a 
pro forma approach to this requirement. She saw its purpose as ensuring 
“that constitutional rights and freedoms will only be sacrificed where it 
is reasonable and justifiable to do so. The concept of constitutional 
entrenchment requires that rights and freedoms be curtailed only in 
response to real and not illusory problems.”134 Time and again she 
demanded evidence to satisfy this requirement. In R. v. Hess, she 
chastised the government for failing to submit any evidence to support 
its deterrence argument in defence of the statutory rape provision. Justice 
Wilson asserted that “[w]here one is dealing with the potential for life 
imprisonment it is not good enough, in my view, to rely on intuition and 
speculation about the potential deterrent effect of an absolute liability 
offence. We need concrete and persuasive evidence to support the 
argument.”135 In several instances, Justice Wilson found that the 
impugned government activity failed to satisfy this requirement. In 
R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan,136 one of the cases in the Labour Trilogy,137 
she would not conclude that the prevention of economic harm to a 
particular sector was per se a government objective of sufficient 
importance to justify abrogating the freedom protected by section 2(d).138  
Justice Wilson famously questioned whether administrative 
convenience and cost in particular could ever meet the pressing and 
substantial requirement for limiting a Charter right. Thus in Singh, she 
stated that “the guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could 
                                                                                                             
133 See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 
2007+), at 39.8. 
134 Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 130, at 550. 
135 R. v. Hess, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906, at 923 (S.C.C.). 
136 Supra, note 126. 
137 The others were Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) and PSAC v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson agreed with Dickson C.J.C. in each of these cases that the right 
to bargain collectively was protected by freedom of expression under s. 2(d) of the Charter. 
138 R.W.D.S.U., supra, note 126, at 487. 
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be ignored because it was administratively convenient to do so.”139 She 
reiterated this position equally forcefully in one of her final cases when 
she asserted: “administrative convenience is not an adequate reason for 
sacrificing Charter rights and freedoms.”140 She expressed the belief that 
it would always be more convenient from an administrative perspective 
to treat disadvantaged groups in society “as an indistinguishable mass” 
rather than to determine individual merit.141 
In R. v. Lee,142 the impugned provision stripped an accused of his 
right to trial by jury for failing to appear without a legitimate excuse for 
so doing. The avowed purpose of the provision was to further the orderly 
and efficient administration of justice, and to foster public respect for the 
criminal justice system in general and the jury trial system in particular. 
Justice Wilson recast this objective in more narrow terms, defining it 
down to the objective of ensuring court attendance. The objective so 
defined, Wilson J. examined the evidence and found that failing to attend 
was not a major problem.143 Once the objective was determined in such 
terms, the examination focused on questions of efficiency, the operation 
of the criminal justice system and the expense incurred for jury trials. 
Not surprisingly, Wilson J. then found that reducing administrative 
inconvenience and reducing expense were not sufficient objectives to 
override such a vital constitutional right.144  
Justice Wilson demanded that the asserted problem be real and not 
hypothetical. One of her final judgments, R. v. Chaulk, released a month 
before she stepped down from the bench, illustrates this. I discuss it in 
some detail because it represents her parting shots at a Court that had 
never accepted her vision of the Charter and the role of the Court 
thereunder. The issue in R. v. Chaulk was whether a provision of the 
Criminal Code which presumed sanity unless an accused proved to the 
contrary violated the presumption of innocence guaranteed by section 
                                                                                                             
139 Singh, [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at 218 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson 
asserted that s. 15(1) of the Charter demanded otherwise:  
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Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, supra, note 130, at 555 (emphasis in original). 
140 Id., at 554. 
141 Id., at 555. 
142 [1989] S.C.J. No. 125, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 (S.C.C.). 
143 Id., at 1419. 
144 Id., at 1420-21. 
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11(d) of the Charter. The majority of the Court, in a decision written by 
Lamer C.J.C. and concurred in by Dickson C.J.C., La Forest, Sopinka 
and Cory JJ., held that the impugned provision infringed the 
presumption of innocence but constituted a reasonable limit under 
section 1. Justice Wilson held that the first branch of Oakes necessitated 
that the government adduce evidence to demonstrate the existence of a 
real social problem. The perceived social problem in this case was the 
prevention of perfectly sane persons who had committed crimes from 
escaping criminal liability on tenuous insanity pleas.145 
Justice Wilson took issue with Lamer C.J.C.’s failure to identify any 
pressing and substantial concern. In her characterization, the provision 
was “a prophylactic measure designed to fend off a hypothetical social 
problem that might arise absent the reverse onus”.146 In Wilson J.’s mind, 
this represented “a significant departure” from the Court’s approach to 
section 1 to that date.147 She asserted that theretofore the Court had 
consistently evaluated challenged laws in terms of their justifiability as a 
response to existing social problems. In the strongest terms, she asked: 
“[D]o we wish to go down this path and justify infringements of 
guaranteed Charter rights on a purely hypothetical basis? And, in 
particular, do we wish to go down this path where such a fundamental 
tenet of our justice system as the presumption of innocence is at stake? I 
have serious reservations about adopting such a course … .”148 Less than 
a month later, Justice Wilson officially retired from the Supreme Court 
of Canada. As we see in the next section, similar concerns echoed 
through her application of the proportionality analysis prong of Oakes. 
(d) The Proportionality Analysis 
It is under the proportionality analysis where the Oakes test was 
most relaxed or, in Justice Wilson’s view, compromised. The 
proportionality analysis of the Oakes test consists of three elements: (1) 
there has to be a rational connection between the means chosen and the 
pressing and substantial government objective; (2) the means must 
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impair the right as little as possible; and (3) there has to be 
proportionality between the effects of the measures limiting the right and 
the objective and between the deleterious and salutary effects of the 
measures.149 It is under the proportionality analysis — specifically its 
second prong — that members of the Court developed a more flexible 
approach that worried Justice Wilson and against which she consistently 
protested. My comments will accordingly focus on this second prong. 
For the most part, Justice Wilson refused to relax the Oakes 
framework. She noted that “[i]t is only in exceptional circumstances that 
the full rigour of Oakes should be ameliorated.”150 In Edwards Books 
itself, which marked the beginning of the relaxation of Oakes, Wilson J. 
dissented as discussed above, specifically on the issue of minimal 
impairment. Again, she chastised the government for failing to bring 
forward sufficient evidence and characterized the legislation as 
“checkerboard” or haphazard.151 But Wilson J. was one of the three 
authors of Irwin Toy, which attempted to outline the circumstances when 
a relaxed version of Oakes would be appropriate. The authors of that 
opinion explained: 
When striking a balance between the claims of competing groups, the 
choice of means, like the choice of ends, frequently will require an 
assessment of conflicting scientific evidence and differing justified 
demands on scarce resources. Democratic institutions are meant to let 
us all share in the responsibility for these difficult choices. Thus, as 
courts review the results of the legislature’s deliberations, particularly 
with respect to the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be 
mindful of the legislature’s representative function.152  
In McKinney, Wilson J. tried to explain the rationale for the more 
flexible approach to section 1. She said that all of the proposed ways of 
dealing with exceptions to Sunday closing laws in Edwards Books had 
their faults. Respecting Irwin Toy, she explained that none of the proposed 
alternatives adequately accomplished the legislature’s admittedly rea-
sonable objective of protecting children from manipulation through 
commercial media. In that context, the Court refused to second-guess the 
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legislative wisdom of choosing to protect the interests of vulnerable 
children at the limited expense of the commercial speech rights of 
advertisers.153 
Looking back on the relaxation of Oakes, Wilson J. saw the central 
message to be drawn from these cases as being that deference was 
appropriate where the legislature was forced to strike a balance between 
the claims of competing groups or where the legislature was seeking to 
promote or protect the interests of the disadvantaged.154 In such contexts, 
Wilson J. stated, the requirement of minimal impairment would be met 
where alternative means are not clearly better than the means adopted by 
the government.155  
It is not necessary to delve particularly deeply into these cases to 
appreciate the tensions that they presented for Justice Wilson and for the 
Court. For Justice Wilson, this tension manifested itself in her desire to 
protect vulnerable groups and therefore to accord some modicum of 
flexibility to the legislature in so doing while still maintaining fidelity to 
the strictness of Oakes. She never articulated her rationale in such terms, 
but perhaps the influence of section 15(2) of the Charter leeched into her 
section 1 conception. This would explain her upholding of legislation 
under section 1 in cases where vulnerable groups were at issue such as 
Irwin Toy (children), Lavigne (union members) and Keegstra (ethnic and 
religious minorities). Conversely, she would not afford deference to the 
legislature in cases where she felt the group at issue was not a vulnerable 
one such as McKinney (younger academics). 
With the notable exception of R. v. Keegstra,156 Justice Wilson 
generally refused to relax the justification standard in criminal cases.157 
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In R. v. Chaulk, one of her last Charter cases, she expressed dismay that 
Chief Justice Lamer of all people would relax the application of the 
Oakes test in a criminal case. She disputed his invocation and 
application of Irwin Toy, contending that it “does not stand for the 
proposition that in balancing the objective of government against the 
guaranteed right of the citizen under s. 1 different levels of scrutiny may 
be applied depending upon the nature of the right”.158 Rather, Oakes was 
the rule and flexible application the exception, whose prerequisite was 
the situation where the guaranteed rights of different groups of citizens 
could not be fully respected. In such cases, it was appropriate for the 
Court to respect government’s attempt at fashioning a compromise 
between competing groups on the basis of policy considerations.159 
Justice Wilson invoked the “singular antagonist” language of Irwin Toy, 
quoting at length from this portion of the judgment which she had co-
authored with Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. (as he then was), both of 
whom had ignored the singular antagonist rule on the facts of the case 
before it in Chaulk.160 
By the time she left the Court, Justice Wilson’s battle to preserve the 
Oakes framework had clearly been lost. She knew it and she feared that 
the Oakes test was slipping away as well. In a 1992 speech, Justice 
Wilson, now retired, expressed her feeling that the Court was only 
paying lip service to Oakes:  
[T]here is no doubt that those who continued to cling to the strict Oakes 
test (like myself) did so out of a concern that the Charter not be 
emasculated, that the shift towards the much more flexible standard of 
reasonableness makes it increasingly likely that governments’ immediate 
objectives will take precedence over the rights and freedoms of 
individuals.161 
Thus, the debate over section 1 had returned full circle to the 
deliberations before the Joint Committee in 1980-1981. Justice Wilson’s 
statements express a sense that the Court had undone much of what had 
been fought for in relation to section 1 during that time. Justice Wilson’s 
position on the relationship between rights and their limits remained 
relatively constant. However, the Court of which she was a member had 
moved significantly from the early days of Singh and Oakes. 
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4. Caveat or Cognitive Dissonance: The Relationship between 
Section 1 and other Sections of the Charter 
So far we have seen how Justice Wilson championed the Oakes 
framework, largely emphasizing it over the text of section 1, despite 
frequent invocations of the latter. However, when it came to the 
relationship between section 1 and other sections of the Charter, Justice 
Wilson favoured argument based on the text of section 1 rather than on 
the application of the Oakes test. Where internal qualifiers existed in the 
text of the right, Justice Wilson did not think that a violation could be 
saved under section 1. Thus, Justice Wilson doubted whether a violation 
of section 7 could ever be saved under section 1. She first expressed this 
in a concurring opinion in the Motor Vehicle Reference.162 In her view, a 
violation of the right to life, liberty and security of the person which 
does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice could neither 
be “reasonable” nor “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”.163 According to her, the only way for government to limit the 
rights under section 7 was through section 33, a circumstance that she 
could only foresee in times of emergency, stating that “[t]his, however, 
will be a policy decision for which the government concerned will be 
politically accountable to the people.”164 She consistently maintained this 
position over the course of her tenure on the Court.165 
In two cases from her last term on the Court, Justice Wilson 
persisted with this approach. In R. v. Hess,166 Justice Wilson and Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) clashed over the proper relationship 
between section 1 and section 7, each invoking originalist justifications 
for her respective position. Justice McLachlin accused Justice Wilson of 
rewriting the Charter by holding that section 1 could never be applicable 
to certain Charter rights. The future Chief Justice stated that “[t]he 
framers of the Charter expressly subjected all the rights and freedoms 
which it guarantees to the override of s. 1. It is not for the courts to alter 
this by developing categories of rights which are immune from scrutiny 
under s. 1.”167 In her response, Justice Wilson agreed that one could not 
say that section 1 was irrelevant or inapplicable to any of the rights and 
freedoms protected by the Charter. However, she returned to the Oakes 
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framework, stating that section 1 was not devoid of values, emphasizing 
the text of section 1 which stipulates “that the impugned provisions must 
be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’”.168 Justice 
Wilson maintained that the courts could not read “demonstrably 
justified” in such a manner as “to give licence to governments to infringe 
rights in any way they please. The values of a free and democratic 
society must be respected. . . . Far from rewriting the Charter this 
approach is entirely consistent with the Charter.”169  
In this rare explicitly originalist exchange, each justice sought 
support for her interpretation in the text and the drafting history of the 
Charter. Justice Wilson recognized that her position on the relationship 
between section 7 and section 1 had not carried the day and recast her 
position in terms that it would be rare for a legislative provision that 
violated the principles of fundamental justice to still be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.170 Justice Wilson had similar 
concerns about the relationship between section 8 and section 1.171  
Justice Wilson’s position on the relationship between section 1 and 
other sections that have internal qualifiers has an internal logic to it. 
Internal qualifiers like “reasonable” or “principles of fundamental 
justice” lack the strictness of Oakes. On their face, they appear to set a 
lower threshold for justifying an infringement of a right compared to the 
strictness of the Oakes framework with its requirement that any 
limitation be both “reasonable” and “demonstrably justifiable”. Under 
such logic, it is hard to fathom how an infringement that was found to be 
“unreasonable” could somehow be saved under section 1. With this 
point, we return to the debate over the language of section 1 before the 
Joint Committee in 1980-1981. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION: DUTY FULFILLED AND DESTINY DENIED 
Justice Wilson did not lobby for a seat on the Supreme Court when 
one was available.172 With the appointment of Sandra Day O’Connor to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in September 1981 and the impending 
mandatory retirement of Justice Martland, speculation about appointing 
a woman to Canada’s highest Court grew. As one of only a few women 
on Canada’s appellate courts at the time, Justice Wilson’s name was 
obviously in the mix and her colleagues on Ontario’s Court of Appeal 
encouraged her to accept the position if the offer came. Like some before 
and since her who have been considered for appointment to Canada’s 
Supreme Court, Justice Wilson had misgivings. But her biographer 
describes her acceptance in the following terms: “ . . . at the end of the 
day Bertha and [her husband] John both knew that if she was appointed 
she had to serve. It was her duty.”173  
Bertha Wilson’s conception of duty encompassed both a personal 
commitment to public service as well as the institutional responsibility 
of the Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter. Her vision of the role 
of the courts under the Charter acknowledged and respected the changes 
that Canada’s democratic representatives had made to our system of 
government. In her view, the courts were given a new responsibility 
under the Charter and they were duty-bound to fulfil it. She did not seem 
particularly enamoured of the dialogue theory popularized after she left 
the bench and which the Court endorsed. Her position was far more 
direct. In her view, each branch of government had its own responsibility 
under the Charter. The courts’ responsibility was to construct a fence 
around the individual. The legislature, of course, has a responsibility to 
ensure that its actions comply with the Charter but it also has the power 
under section 33 to overrule the courts should it so choose. 
The democratic element of Justice Wilson’s constitutional vision 
gave voice to the many groups who participated in the process before the 
Joint Committee, many of whom were very concerned about the low 
threshold for limiting rights in the draft of the Charter tabled with the 
Joint Committee. She would have likely rejected or dismissed the notion 
that she was an originalist. But her jurisprudence draws its assertions of 
normative legitimacy directly from the text and the historical context of 
                                                                                                             
172 See Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2001), at 124-28. 
173 Id., at 128. 
368 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
the framing of the Charter and therefore Justice Wilson is properly 
considered a moderate originalist, Canadian version. This originalism 
manifested itself in its strict view of section 1 as translated by the Oakes 
framework to which Justice Wilson remained faithful during her entire 
tenure on the Court. 
It is only in one of her final Charter judgments, R. v. Chaulk,174 that 
we see a hint of Justice Wilson’s frustration with her colleagues for 
abandoning even a semblance of fidelity to the Oakes test. Her positions 
had remained relatively constant during her five years on the Court since 
Oakes. However, her colleagues shifted and by the time she stepped 
down from the Court in January 1991, Justice Wilson’s position had 
become increasingly isolated. 
In Singh, Justice Wilson recognized the tension inherent in the 
limitations process. She stated that if too low a threshold was set, the 
courts would run the risk of “emasculating the Charter” while if too high 
a threshold was set, the courts would run the risk of “unjustifiably 
restricting government action”.175 Most of the judges were concerned 
about the latter proposition. The interpretation of certain rights such as 
sections 7 and 15 became increasingly complex on the one hand and the 
Oakes test was relaxed on the other. In contrast, Justice Wilson was 
generally comfortable with the results caused by her fidelity to the 
strictness of Oakes. 
Justice Wilson’s jurisprudence reflects her originalist conception of 
the Charter as a rights-bearing, potentially transformative document. 
Looking back on her judgments 17 years after she left the bench causes 
one to ponder whether her fidelity to the framework of Oakes would 
have been sustainable throughout the 1990s as the Court entered a 
different period of new challenges and divisions within the Court. I 
suspect that Justice Wilson would have persisted in her fidelity to Oakes 
but proved more flexible at the rights definition stage as she had 
demonstrated in cases such as Jones and Hufsky.176 The joint author of 
the expansive definition of freedom of expression in Irwin Toy177 might 
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have joined the minority opinion in Sharp178 which expressed a 
willingness to retreat from this definition in obscenity cases.  
During those nine years on our nation’s highest Court, Justice 
Wilson articulated a robust vision of the Charter and the relationship 
between rights and their limits thereunder. She was frequently in dissent 
or concurring separately, raising the question of whether her 
jurisprudence has any enduring political or legal significance or should 
simply be considered marginal. One view was expressed by another 
great dissenter, Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who invoked the words 
of Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court that a “dissent in a 
court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the 
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct 
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been 
betrayed”.179 Dissents may give hope to some that an alternative vision 
may speak to future generations and one day become a reality,180 
although some think that rarely happens.181  
Justice Wilson didn’t volunteer. But once conscripted to serve, Bertha 
Wilson fulfilled her duty as she saw it: fidelity to the strictness of the Oakes 
framework which she believed correctly encapsulated the transformational 
purpose of the Charter project based upon an original understanding of the 
making of the Charter. The rich historical understanding of the events of 
1980-1982 which provided the foundation for Justice Wilson’s juris-
prudential outlook serves as a reminder of what the Charter’s destiny might 
have been and perhaps what is still possible one day. 
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